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We introduce a new mechanism-design problem called fair imposition. In this setting
a center wishes to fairly allocate tasks among a set of agents whose cost structures
are known only to them, and thus will not reveal their true costs without appropriate
incentives. The center, with the power to impose arbitrary tasks and payments on
the agents, has the additional goal that his net payment to these agents is never
positive (or, that it is tightly bounded if a loss is unavoidable). We consider two
diﬀerent notions of fairness that the center may wish to achieve. The central notion,
which we call k-fairness, is in the spirit of max-min fairness. We present both
positive results (in the form of concrete mechanisms) and negative results (in the
form of impossibility theorems) concerning these criteria. We also brieﬂy discuss an
alternative, more traditional interpretation of our setting and results, in the context
of auctions.
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21 Introduction
Central allocation of tasks among multiple agents is a fundamental problem in
several ﬁelds, including economics, computer science, and operations research.
In this class of problems there is a center, or procurer, who aims to allocate
one or more tasks among several agents (e.g., companies, employees, or com-
puters) in a way that meets some set of criteria. In the setting we consider, fair
imposition, the center possesses the ability to impose arbitrary behaviors on
the individual agents, but has no access to their private information (specif-
ically, their costs for performing the tasks). We assume that this dictator is
frugal in that he wishes to relegate the entire cost to the agents (a goal for-
mally referred to as no deﬁcit). However, we also assume that the dictator is
benign in the sense that he wishes the agent costs to be both equitable and as
low as possible. Later we will formally deﬁne notions of fairness that capture
these general goals.
The setting of fair imposition is quite natural. It can serve as a model of how
a large corporation might divide an unexpected task among its business units.
For example, consider a corporation with three factories, each operating as a
proﬁt center. Imagine they are all due for a centrally-ﬁnanced upgrade that
would result in a boost to productivity, except that the magnitude of each
boost is known only by the individual factory manager. Suppose that budget
cuts will force the CFO to cancel one of the three factory upgrades, and he
has the following considerations: he wishes the overall productivity of the ﬁrm
to decline minimally, and he wishes that each of the managers feel that the
outcome is fair. What protocol will achieves these goals?
3It is not hard to come up with other applications of this general framework. For
example, it can serve as a model of planning in a centralized economy. 1 The
application that in fact served as initial motivation for this work is military
air transportation. The US military uses civilian aircraft for a surprisingly
high fraction of its transportation needs. This is true even in times of peace,
and certainly in war times. In principle the government has the ability to
commandeer the aircraft at will, but of course that is not a tenable course of
action. Instead it pays the civilian carriers, but the way in which it currently
does so is largely ad hoc and ineﬃcient. The models and protocols presented
in this paper may, at least in principle, oﬀer a better alternative.
What are the tools available to the center? In principle, all he can do is
institute a procurement protocol, which is an orderly procedure of information
exchange and an outcome function. The outcome function selects agent(s) to
provide the service(s) and determines payments to or from the agents – both
as a function of this information exchange. The trick is to design the protocol
so as to induce the agents to exchange information in way that leads to an
outcome desired by the center.
To show the issues that arise in the design of such a protocol, consider the
following straw-man protocol for allocating a single task to one of n agents.
Let v[1] be the lowest cost for this task among the agents. In this protocol the
center asks each agent to declare its cost, assigns the task to the agent with
the lowest declared cost (call it ˆ v[1]), pays n−1
n ˆ v[1] to this agent, and collects
a payment of
ˆ v[1]
n from each other agent. The net payments by the center are
exactly zero, and if ˆ v = v then all agents suﬀer a loss of exactly
v[1]
n . Notice
that this outcome minimizes inequity among the agents and bounds the loss of
each agent at the lowest possible amount, given our requirement of no deﬁcit.
4Formally, we deﬁne 1-fairness to be achieved if the no agent suﬀers a loss of
more than
v[1]
n . More generally, k-fairness is achieved when the no agent loses
more than
v[k]
n , where v[k] is the k-lowest cost among the agents. Notice that
this notion fairness is based on maximin principle of [1]. The comparable idea
in computer science is max-min fairness, which is a widely used criterion for
fair division of bandwidth among a set of users (see, e.g., [2]). Also note that
this mechanism could not have achieved 1-fairness (in conjunction with no
deﬁcit) if it had not assigned the task to the agent with the lowest cost. We
will show a general result that we get economic eﬃciency “for free”; that is,
given our other desiderata, we can assume without loss of generality that it is
satisﬁed.
However, this protocol has a crucial ﬂaw: the assumption that each agent will
truthfully reveal its cost is obviously invalid, because the agent who submits
the lowest cost has an incentive to inﬂate its declared cost to an amount just
below the second lowest declared cost. By increasing ˆ v[1] in this way, this agent
would increase its payment from the center.
This example illustrates why the center must resort to incentive engineering
of the sort encountered in mechanism design. Indeed, the reader familiar with
mechanism design (for an introduction see [3]) might be tempted to view
fair imposition as already addressed by that literature. However, the technical
diﬀerences are substantive, and the solutions called for are diﬀerent as a result.
Although we start the formal treatment only in the next section, for such
readers let us make the following technical comment: in the setting of fair
imposition we retain the requirements of incentive compatibility, no deﬁcit,
and economic eﬃciency, jettison the requirement of individual rationality, and
add a new requirement of fairness.
5Although we feel that the setting as discussed is natural and important, for
the same class of expert readers we should also mention an alternative inter-
pretation of our framework and results. This is in the more standard context
of auctions, where the mechanism designer wishes to not only maximize social
welfare, but to also share the surplus as even among the agents as possible via
side payments. 3 We will discuss this interpretation only brieﬂy, and in two
places – after the technical exposition, and in the conclusions section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally deﬁne the
single-task fair imposition setting as a mechanism design problem (including
the alternative interpretation of our setting in the context of an auction).
Section 3 presents our basic results concerning the feasibility of fair allocation:
when no deﬁcit is a strict requirement, we prove that we cannot achieve 2-
fairness (and thus also not 1-fairness) and present a mechanism that achieves
3-fairness (and thus k-fairness for k > 3 as well). An inequity of the mechanism
used for this possibility result, in which one agent pays more than other agents
despite having a lower cost, leads into a discussion and an impossibility result
concerning our second type of fairness– avoiding what we will call a competence
penalty. We also give a mechanism that achieves 1-fairness while incurring a
minimal deﬁcit. The techniques and results presented for the single task case
can be generalized to multiple tasks. We demonstrate this possibility in Section
4 by extending the setting to two (possibly interacting) tasks and providing
similar mechanisms and impossibility results. Concluding remarks are given
in Section 5.
Note that, for purposes of readability, full proofs are postponed to the ap-
pendix and replaced in the text with proof sketches.
62 Setting
We construct the fair imposition setting for the single task case within the
basic mechanism design framework. While most of our criteria are consistent
with those of mechanism design, the novelty of our setting lies in our new goal
of k-fairness.
2.1 The Mechanism Design Problem
There exists a single task, a center, and a set of agents N = {1,2,...,n} who
can accomplish the task. Each agent i has a privately known type vi ∈ <+,
which represents its nonnegative cost to execute the task. The center assigns
the task to an agent and collects a payment (which can be negative) from each
agent through the use of a mechanism Γ = hB,f(·)i.
The set of possible strategies for each agent i is deﬁned by B = {bi|bi : <+ →
<+}. A strategy bi for agent i maps each possible type to a declared type,
bi(vi), which will also be referred to as ˆ vi (or as vi if ˆ vi = vi). By restricting
the space of messages for an agent to declared types, we are only considering
direct mechanisms.
The function f : <n
+ → O takes as input a declared type from each agent
and returns an outcome in the set O. An outcome o ∈ O is a pair of vectors
(g,t), where g = (g1,...,gn) and t = (t1,...,tn). Each gi ∈ {0,1} represents
whether or not agent i is assigned the task, and each ti ∈ < is the amount
that agent i must pay to the center. 3 For simplicity, we will use gi(v) and
ti(v) to represent the corresponding terms in the outcome f(v). We also have
7the restriction that
Pn
i=1 gi = 1 in order to capture the fact that the task can
only be assigned to one agent. We will overload the function f(·) so that it can
take as its arguments the declared types of n-1 agents, instead of the standard
n. In this case, the mechanism is restricted so that gj = 0 and tj = 0 for the
agent j whose type was not given as an argument. While the set of possible
strategies B is constant for all mechanisms, f(·) is the degree of freedom used
to satisfy the goals of the mechanism designer.
Each agent i has a linear utility function that depends on both the outcome
and the agent’s own type: ui((g,t),vi) = −gi·vi−ti. We assume that all agents
are rational, in the sense that they are expected-utility maximizers.
In the sequel we will use the notational shorthand v = (v1,v2,...,vn) for the
vector of types of all agents. The vector of all types excluding that of agent
i is v−i = (v1,...,vi−1,vi+1,...,vn). We can then refer to v as (vi,v−i). For a
vector v, we denote the jth lowest cost by v[j]. In this way, we can use v−i[j] to
represent the jth lowest cost among all agents other than agent i. Similarly,
we will use b = (b1,...,bn) to represent a vector of strategies for all agents.
Then, b(v) would be the vector (b1(v1),...,bn(vn)). Without loss of generality,
we will assume that the agents are sorted in non-decreasing order of cost. That
is, v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vn. This assumption is solely for expositional purposes–
the center has no knowledge of any such ordering.
2.2 Mechanism Criteria
Four requirements that are often present in a mechanism-design setting are in-
centive compatibility, no deﬁcit, economic eﬃciency, and individual rationality.
8We retain the ﬁrst three as requirements. The fourth, individual rationality,
which requires that all agents always have nonnegative utility for the outcome
of the mechanism, is often present when agents are assumed to have the option
of not participating in the mechanism. Since this assumption does not hold in
our setting, where the center can force the agents to both provide a desired
service and make payments to the center, we replace individual rationality
with the notion of k-fairness. In this section we formally deﬁne each of our
criteria.
We say that incentive compatibility holds when each agent maximizes its util-
ity by declaring its true type, regardless of the declarations of all other agents.
Deﬁnition 1 A mechanism satisﬁes incentive compatibility (IC) if for all i
and vi, ui(f(vi, ˆ v−i),vi) ≥ ui(f(v0
i, ˆ v−i),vi) holds for all v0
i, and ˆ v−i.
Our second requirement, no deﬁcit, requires that the center never lose money.
Deﬁnition 2 A mechanism satisﬁes no deﬁcit (ND) if for all ˆ v:
P
i ti(ˆ v) ≥ 0.
A third desideratum is economic eﬃciency, which simply requires that in every
equilibrium, our choice rule g(·) select the lowest cost agent as the service
provider, with ties broken arbitrarily.
Deﬁnition 3 A mechanism satisﬁes economic eﬃciency (EE) if for all v and
all equilibria b, there exists an agent j such that: gj(b(v)) = 1 and vj = v[1].
We now deﬁne the notion of fairness motivated in the introduction. In words,
k-fairness holds if in all equilibria the utility loss of each agent is bounded
by kth lowest cost among the agents, divided by the number of participating
agents.
9Deﬁnition 4 For any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, a mechanism satisﬁes k-fairness if for all
v and all equilibria b, ui(f(b(v)),vi) ≥ −
v[k]
n holds for each agent i.
Based on the preceding two deﬁnitions, we can see the need for incentive
compatibility, because both EE and k-fairness depend on the true type of
the agents, despite the fact that the mechanism can only base g and t on
the declared types. If IC is satisﬁed, then we only have to consider the single
equilibrium in which all agents declare their type truthfully (that is, b(v) = v).
On the other hand, if IC is not satisﬁed, then both EE and k-fairness, as
deﬁned here, are unreasonable goals for a mechanism. Thus, in the sequel they
both will only appear as goals of a mechanism in conjunction with the goal
of IC. While an indirect mechanism that merely induces a dominant strategy
equilibrium (with corresponding changes to the deﬁnition of EE and k-fairness)
would have suﬃced, the Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategies (see, for
example, [3]) tells us that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our space
of mechanisms to those in which truthful revelation of types is a dominant
strategy.
2.3 Alternative Interpretation
While in our motivating examples each vi would be positive, since it represents
the cost of completing the task, our formal setting does not restrict vi in
any way. An alternative interpretation of our formulation, which makes a
more apparent connection to the existing mechanism design literature, is as
a private-value auction for an indivisible good. In this case, each vi would be
negative, representing the value (or negative cost) of the good to the particular
agent.
10While the mechanisms we present would satisfy individual rationality when
each vi is negative, they would instead suﬀer from a free-rider problem, in
which agents who have no value for the good would have incentive to partici-
pate because they would receive a positive payment from the center. Thus, our
mechanisms apply best to settings in which the bidders all have an equal, a
priori claim to the object (e.g., siblings at a probate court), and thus we wish
to make the auction as “fair” as possible by having the winner compensate
the losing bidders. In the conclusions section we will revisit our results in the
context of this interpretation.
3 Results
We begin by proving that the requirement of EE will never prevent us from
ﬁnding a mechanism that satisﬁes our other requirements. Then, we take ND
as a ﬁrm requirement and show that we cannot achieve 2-fairness, but can
achieve 3-fairness. The mechanism we construct for the possibility result has
the property that an agent with a lower cost than other agents is forced to
pay more than these agents. We then prove that this competence penalty is
unavoidable. We conclude this section with a mechanism that achieves 1-
fairness, at the cost of a slight relaxation of our ND requirement.
3.1 Restrictions to EE Mechanisms
Before moving onto possibility and impossibility results, it will be helpful to
restrict the space of mechanisms we need to consider. Speciﬁcally, if our goal
is to ﬁnd a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, k-fairness and ND, then we can limit
11our search to economically eﬃcient mechanisms.
Lemma 1 If there exists a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, k-fairness and ND,
then there exists a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, k-fairness, ND, and EE.
Proof (sketch): By construction. Start with any mechanism Γ (deﬁned by
g(·) and t(·)) that satisﬁes IC, k-fairness and ND. Considering each possible v
separately, we transform Γ into a mechanism that maintains these properties
and also satisﬁes EE. Let j be the agent who is the service provider selected by
Γ (that is, gj(v) = 1). If j = 1, then Γ already satisﬁes EE and we are done for
this particular v (recall that we have ordered the agents by cost). Otherwise,
we set g1(v) = 1 and gj(v) = 0. Then, to keep utility constant for all agents,
we set t1(v) ← t1(v) − v1 and tj(v) ← tj(v) + vj. Constant utility means that
IC and k-fairness continue to hold, and ND continues to hold because the
center’s net revenue from the agents changes by (vj − v1) ≥ 0.
3.2 An Impossibility Result for 2-Fairness
When we require IC and ND, it is not surprising that 1-fairness is not achiev-
able. These three conditions together force the utility of each agent to be
exactly −
v[1]
n . The fact that v[1] is unknown makes this impossible to accom-
plish. However, based on the success of the Groves mechanism (see [4]), one
might expect that a “second-best” solution would be possible, allowing us to
achieve 2-fairness. However, this is not the case.
Theorem 1 There does not exist a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, 2-fairness,
and ND, for any n ≥ 2.
12Proof (sketch): We will use a proof by contradiction that works for all
n ≥ 2. Assume that a mechanism does exist for a given n ≥ 2 that satisﬁes
IC, 2-fairness, and ND. Because of IC, we can assume that all agents declare
truthfully, and Lemma 1 allows us assume that a mechanism exists that also
satisﬁes EE (that is, g1(v) = 1).
A useful property (that we will use in later proof sketches) of mechanisms that
satisfy k-fairness, IC, and EE is that they must pay each agent an amount
that would satisfy k-fairness even if the agent’s true type were at the boundary
of changing which agent has the lowest cost. That is, agent 1 must be paid
as if its type were v2, and all other agents must be paid as if their type
were v1. The reason that this property holds is that IC demands that an
agent’s payment be constant for all declarations that do not change the service
provider. Otherwise, there must be some vector v in which this agent has an
incentive to lie, because the only other factor in the agent’s utility function
(−gi ·vi) does not change. Furthermore, the requirement that the mechanism
satisfy k-fairness places a bound on this payment. In the worst case (from the
center’s point of view), the service provider’s cost is equal to the second-lowest
cost (thus requiring the maximum amount of reimbursement for executing the
task). For each of the non-service provider, the worst case is that their cost is
equal to lowest cost (thus minimizing the k-th lowest cost).
Applying this rule, it must be the case that the constant value that agent 1
pays is bounded by t1(v1,v−1) ≤ −n−1
n v2. For the other agents (i 6= 1), the
bound is ti(vi,v−i) ≤ v1/n, because v1 becomes the second lowest cost when
this agent’s type is considered to be v1.
13We can then show the following upper bound on the net payments to the
center: t1(v)+Σi6=1ti(v) ≤ −n−1
n v2 +(n−1)· v1
n . Since v2 > v1 is possible, ND
is not satisﬁed, reaching a contradiction.
Because k-fairness is strictly more diﬃcult to satisfy than (k −1)-fairness, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 There does not exist a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, 1-fairness,
and ND, for any n ≥ 2.
Note that we cannot show this result for n = 1. A counterexample is a mech-
anism that simply assigns the task to the single agent and pays it exactly
zero.
3.3 A Possibility Result for 3-Fairness
We now construct a mechanism to show that 3-fairness is the minimal level of
fairness that we can achieve in conjunction with ND and IC.
Mechanism Fair3:
• Each agent i submits a declared cost ˆ vi.
• An agent j with the lowest declared cost is selected (that is, ˆ vj = ˆ v[1]).
• Assignment and payment rules are constructed as follows:
· ∀i gi(ˆ v) =
1 if i = j
0 otherwise
· ∀i ti(ˆ v) =

ˆ v−i[2]
n − ˆ v[2] if i = j
ˆ v−i[2]
n otherwise
14In words, the service provider is reimbursed an amount (ˆ v2) such that this
agent is the only one who can potentially make a proﬁt from this “transaction”.
The rest of the payment rule (
ˆ v−i[2]
n ) for each agent i is equal to the second
lowest declared cost among all agents other than agent i.
Theorem 2 Mechanism Fair3 satisﬁes IC, 3-fairness, ND, and EE, for all
n ≥ 3.
Proof (sketch): IC holds because the payments ﬁt the Groves scheme [4].
EE then follows from IC and the deﬁnition of Fair3. Each agent’s payment
consists of an “oﬀset payment” (
ˆ v−i[2]
n ) that does not depend on the agent’s
type, plus the amount by which the agent’s presence aﬀects the costs incurred
by the other agents. This amount is −ˆ v2 for the service provider, because with-
out the service provider the agent with the second-lowest cost would be forced
to complete the task, and zero for all other agents, because their presence
obviously does not change which agent is selected as the service provider.
Given IC, the payments are: t1(v) = −v2 + v3
n for the service provider, t2(v) =
v3
n for agent 2, and ti(v) = v2
n for all remaining agents (i ≥ 3). Thus, ND holds
because:
P
i ti(v) = (−v2 + v3
n ) + v3
n +
P
i≥3
v2
n ≥ −v2 + n
nv2 = 0.
Since IC holds, ui(f(v),vi) = −ti(f(v),vi) holds for all non-service providers,
and u1(f(v),v1) = −v1 − t1(f(v),v1) = −v1 + v2 − v3
n ≥ −v3
n holds for the
service provider, we can conclude that 3-fairness holds.
153.4 Competence Penalty
A closer look at mechanism Fair3 reveals a disturbing inequity of payments
among the agents. Notice that the agent with the second lowest cost pays
v3
n , while the other non-service providers pay v2
n . The existence of inequity,
in and of itself, is not very troublesome, and could even be justiﬁed if the
agents who pay less had declared a lower cost, intuitively making themselves
more “valuable” to the mechanism. However, Fair3 produces the opposite
eﬀect. The agent who submitted the lowest valuation among the non-service
providers pays the most of this group, enduring what we will call a competence
penalty.
Deﬁnition 5 A mechanism enforces a competence penalty if there exists a
vector v and two distinct agents i and j such that gi(v) = gj(v) = 0, vi < vj,
and ti(v) > tj(v).
Note that we have restricted the deﬁnition to only consider the non-service
providers. We could have included the service provider into this deﬁnition, but
our negative result below holds even for the current deﬁnition.
The competence penalty present in mechanism Fair3 turns out to be surpris-
ingly unavoidable. Not only is it impossible to construct a mechanism that
satisﬁes 3-fairness and ND and is free of this type of inequity, we cannot even
settle for n-fairness.
Theorem 3 There does not exist a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, n-fairness,
and ND, and that does not enforce a competence penalty, for any ﬁxed number
of agents n ≥ 2.
16Proof (sketch): The proof of this result for n = 2 follows directly from
Theorem 1. For any n ≥ 3, assume that a mechanism does exist that satisﬁes
IC, n-fairness, and ND, and that does not enforce a competence penalty. By
Lemma 1, we can assume that g1(v) = 1.
The ﬁrst step towards a contradiction is to prove by induction that for each
agent i such that 1 < i ≤ n (i.e., the non-service providers), ti(v) ≤ vi−1/n
must hold. Starting with the base case of i = n, we must show that tn(v) ≤
vn−1/n. Because of n-fairness, tn(v) ≤ vn/n must hold. Since the center must
pay agent n as if its type were v1 (using the argument presented in the proof
sketch of Theorem 1), this bound becomes tn(v) ≤ vn−1/n, because the nth
lowest cost becomes the vn−1 when agent n’s declaration is changed to v1.
The inductive step for each i in the range 1 < i < n proceeds similarly. By the
inductive assumption, ti+1(v) ≤ vi/n. We need to show that ti(v) ≤ vi−1/n.
To avoid a competence penalty, ti(v) ≤ ti+1(v) ≤ vi/n. The bound ti(v) ≤ vi/n
becomes ti(v) ≤ vi−1/n by the same argument used for the base case.
We complete the proof by showing that these bounds prevent the mechanism
from satisfying n-fairness, which we show here for the case of n = 3. Using
the bounds we just derived, the center can collect a maximum of v1
3 + v2
3 from
agents 2 and 3. As shown in the proof sketch of Theorem 1, agent 1 must be
paid n−1
n v2 = 2
3v2. Since v1 < v2 is possible, ND is violated, a contradiction.
Since (k−1)-fairness implies k-fairness, the following corollary trivially follows.
Corollary 2 There does not exist a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, k-fairness,
and ND, and does not enforce a competence penalty, for any 1 ≤ k < n and
17any ﬁxed number of agents n ≥ 2.
3.5 A Possibility Result for 1-Fairness
Given the fact that ND forces us to settle for 3-fairness, a natural question
is how much the center must pay in order to achieve 1-fairness. Indeed, while
in some situations the center can expect to pay nothing, in many others it
cannot demand as much. For example, in the military transportation domain
which motivated this work, the relationship between the government and the
airlines is not a simple one of dictator and subjects. If Fair3 were implemented,
one would expect airlines to balk at the fact that the government not only
receives the ﬂight for free, but actually makes a proﬁt. For these two reasons,
we present a protocol that sacriﬁces ND in a minimal way in order to achieve
1-fairness.
Mechanism BoundedFair1:
• Each agent i submits a declared cost ˆ vi.
• An agent j with the lowest declared cost is selected (that is, ˆ vj = ˆ v[1]).
• Assignment and payment rules are constructed as follows:
· ∀i gi(ˆ v) =
1 if i = j
0 otherwise
· ∀i ti(ˆ v) =

ˆ v−i[1]
n − ˆ v[2] if i = j
ˆ v−i[1]
n otherwise
To quantify the amount of budget deﬁcit the center suﬀers, we introduce the
18following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 A mechanism satisﬁes m-bounded deﬁcit (m-BD) if for all ˆ v,
P
i ti(ˆ v) ≥ −m.
We can show that the budget deﬁcit for mechanism BoundedFair1 is capped
by the diﬀerence in cost between the two lowest cost agents.
Theorem 4 Mechanism BoundedFair1 satisﬁes IC, 1-fairness, (v2−v1)-BD,
and EE, for any n ≥ 2.
Proof (sketch): IC follows in the same way as it did for Fair3, because
the only change is in the “oﬀset” component (
ˆ v−i[1]
n ) of the payment function:
it now uses the lowest cost among the other agents rather than the second
lowest cost. EE follows directly from IC and the deﬁnition of the mechanism.
1-fairness holds because of IC and the fact that the payment for the service
provider is t1(v) = −v2 + v2
n , causing its utility is then u1(f(v),v1) = −v1 −
(−v2 + v2
n ) = −v1
n − n−1
n v1 + n−1
n v2 ≥ −v1
n , while the utility for a non-service
provider (i > 1) is the negative of its transfer function: ui(f(v),vi) = −v1
n .
Finally, to show (v2 − v1)-BD:
P
i ti(v) = (−v2 + v2
n ) +
P
i6=1
v1
n = −n−1
n v2 +
n−1
n v1 ≥ −(v2 − v1).
The power of this protocol lies in the fact that it only requires two proﬁcient
agents in order to be reasonable for the center. One would expect v2−v1 << v1
to hold for a set of airlines when the task is a ﬂight between two major cities.
For example, suppose the two cheapest airlines could provide the ﬂight for
$750K and $800K. While the government would be unwilling to pay the full
$750K, a payment of $800K-$750K=$50K may be acceptable. An additional
advantage of this mechanism is that it does not enforce a competence penalty,
19because all non-service providers now pay the same amount.
4 Multiple Task Setting
So far, our study has concentrated on the imposition of a single task on a
set of agents. If there are several independent tasks, then we can execute
a separate protocol for each task and apply the techniques and results we
previously obtained. However, it is often the case that the cost to complete
a set of tasks is not simply the sum of the costs of the individual tasks. For
example, a carrier’s cost for a pair of ﬂights might be lower than the sum of
the costs for the individual ﬂights when the destination of the ﬁrst ﬂight is the
origin of the second. Alternatively, the cost for a pair could be higher when
both ﬂights originate from the same city and the airline only has one plane
at this location. In such cases, the solution is not as simple, but we can still
achieve results comparable to those of the single task setting. In this section we
consider the case of two interacting services, but this number is only chosen
for ease of exposition. The generalizations and techniques presented can be
easily applied to any number of interacting tasks.
We ﬁrst need to extend our formulation. In the new setting, which we call the
Multiple Task Setting (MTS), there are two tasks, 1 and 2. We will use the
variable s to index an individual task and S for a set of tasks. The type of agent
i is now expanded to a function, vi :
n
{1},{2},{1,2}
o
→ <+, which maps
each non-empty subset of the two tasks to a nonnegative cost. The possible
interaction between the services is reﬂected by the absence of a restriction that
vi({1,2}) = vi({1}) + vi({2}). We also extend the notation for the ranking of
a valuation so that v[k](S) is the kth lowest cost to complete the tasks in S.
20Additionally, gi is expanded to a vector (gi,1,gi,2), where gi,s ∈ {0,1} denotes
whether or not task s is assigned to agent i. The restriction that each task is
only assigned once is now captured by:
Pn
i=1 gi,s = 1 for s = 1,2.
For convenience we will add some new notation. The cost of an assignment gi
to agent i is represented by the function ci(gi,vi) = gi,1(1 − gi,2) · vi({1}) +
gi,2(1−gi,1)·vi({2})+gi,1·gi,2·vi({1,2}), where the terms of the form (1−gi,s)
are used to avoid double counting the cost of completing a task. The utility
function of agent i is then: ui(o,vi) = −ci(gi,vi) − ti. We will also use an
aggregate cost term for the total cost of all agents: c(g,v) =
P
i ci(gi,vi).
The deﬁnition of k-fairness can be extended in various ways for this setting.
The extension we choose reﬂects a minimal change from our original deﬁnition:
the bound on the loss of each agent for k-fairness in the current setting is
the sum of the bounds for k-fairness of the single task setting when both of
the tasks considered separately. This is an admittedly weak extension, and
stronger extensions that consider the potential sub-additivity of costs do not
allow results as strong as the ones we will show.
Deﬁnition 7 A mechanism satisﬁes k-fairness in the Multiple Task Setting
if for all b and v, ui(f(b(v)),vi) ≥ −
v[k]({1})+v[k]({2})
n holds for each agent i.
Since the deﬁnitions of IC and ND carry over from the original setting, the
only other deﬁnition we need to update is that of EE.
Deﬁnition 8 A mechanism satisﬁes economic eﬃciency (EE) in the Multiple
Task Setting if for all b and v, c(g(b(v)),v) ≤ c(g0(b(v)),v) holds for all g0(·).
In words, there can be no assignment rule g0(·) that assigns tasks to agents in
a way that reduces the total cost to the agents. Deﬁne g∗(·) to be any function
21g(·) that satisﬁes EE (with the tie-breaking rule being a degree of freedom).
4.1 MTS: An Impossibility Result for 2-Fairness
It is easy to extend our infeasibility results for 2-fairness to the current setting.
It is always possible that task 2 is a “dummy task” that all agents can complete
at no cost (that is, ∀i vi({2}) = 0 and vi({1,2}) = vi({1})). In this case, the
setting reduces to our original one.
Proposition 5 There does not exist a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, 2-fairness,
and ND, for any n ≥ 2, in the Interacting Services Setting.
4.2 MTS: A Possibility Result for 3-Fairness
To achieve 3-fairness with our other requirements, we again borrow ideas from
the Groves mechanism by aligning the interesting of each individual agent
with those of the entire system, while charging each agent an oﬀset payment
that does not depend on their own declared cost in order to satisfy ND. The
“oﬀset” payment is simply the sum of the two oﬀset payments that would
exist if Fair3 were executed twice. The rest of the payment rule for each agent
i is the costs incurred by all other agents j 6= i from execution of tasks when
agent i participates minus the amount that these costs would be otherwise.
22Mechanism Fair3b:
• Each agent i submits a declared cost ˆ vi.
• Assignment and payment rules are constructed as follows:
· ∀i,s gi,s(ˆ v) = g∗
i,s(ˆ v)
· ∀i ti(ˆ v) =
ˆ v−i[2]({1})+ˆ v−i[2]({2})
n +
P
j6=i cj(g∗
j(ˆ v), ˆ vj) −
P
j6=i cj(g∗
j(ˆ v−i), ˆ vj)
We now show the result of executing mechanism Fair3b when the participating
agents are the three from Table 1.
Insert Table 1 here.
If ˆ v = v, then task 1 is assigned to agent 3 and task 2 is assigned to agent 1
(that is, the only two non-zero values for g(·) are g3,1(v) = 1 and g1,2(v) = 1).
The transfer functions are: t1(v) = 14+16
3 +5−(5+13) = −3, t2(v) = 11+16
3 +
(5 + 10) − (5 + 10) = 9, and t3(v) = 14+13
3 + 10 − 20 = −1.
If we modiﬁed the type of agent 2 so that v2({1,2}) = 14, then Fair3 would
instead assign both tasks to this agent (that is, g2,1(v) = 1 and g2,2(v) = 1).
The transfer functions would then be: t1(v) = 14+16
3 + 14 − 14 = 10, t2(v) =
11+16
3 + 0 − (5 + 10) = −6, and t3(v) = 14+13
3 + 14 − 14 = 9.
Proposition 6 Mechanism Fair3b satisﬁes IC, 3-fairness, ND, and EE, for
any n ≥ 2, in the Interacting Services Setting.
We omit the proof because of its similarity to that of both Fair3 and the
Groves mechanism.
234.3 MTS: Competence Penalty
Given the similarity between mechanisms Fair3 and Fair3b, it is not surprising
that Fair3b also enforces a competence penalty on the agents. Even if we
extend the deﬁnition of competence penalty in a relatively weak manner, we
can still show the same impossibility result as we did for the single task setting.
Deﬁnition 9 A mechanism enforces a competence penalty in the Multiple
Task Setting if there exists a vector v and two distinct agents i and j such
that the following conditions all hold:
(1) gi,s(v) = gj,s(v) = 0, for s = 1,2
(2) ∀S vi(S) ≤ vj(S)
(3) ∃S vi(S) < vj(S)
(4) ti(v) > tj(v).
Like the previous deﬁnition, this one only considers agents who were not as-
signed a task. In words, a mechanism enforces a competence penalty if one
non-service provider pays more than another even though its type weakly
“dominates” that of the other agent.
We can then show the following impossibility result.
Proposition 7 There does not exist a mechanism that satisﬁes IC, n-fairness,
and ND, and that does not enforce a competence penalty, for any ﬁxed number
of agents n ≥ 2, in the Multiple Task Setting.
The proof is omitted because of its similarity to that of the original impossi-
bility result. Intuitively, we can again use the possibility of a one of the tasks
being a “dummy task”.
244.4 MTS: A Possibility Result for 1-Fairness
Additionally, we can extend the mechanism BoundedFair1 in order to achieve
1-fairness while accepting a (relatively small) budget deﬁcit.
Mechanism BoundedFair1b:
• Each agent i submits a declared cost ˆ vi.
• Assignment and payment rules are constructed as follows:
· ∀i,s gi,s(ˆ v) = g∗
i,s(ˆ v)
· ∀i ti(ˆ v) =
ˆ v−i[1]({1})+ˆ v−i[1]({2})
n +
P
j6=i cj(g∗
j(ˆ v), ˆ vj) −
P
j6=i cj(g∗
j(ˆ v−i), ˆ vj)
The bound on the budget deﬁcit for this mechanism is a simple extension of
the bound shown for the single task setting.
Proposition 8 Mechanism BoundedFair1b satisﬁes IC, 1-fairness, EE, and
h
v[2]({1})−v[1]({1})+v[2]({2})−v[1]({2})
i
-BD, for any n ≥ 2, in the Multiple
Task Setting.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the addition of fairness as a goal in the mechanism-
design setting. The novelty of this work lies not in the consideration of fairness
– about which there is of course substantial literature in economics – but in its
consideration in the context of mechanism design. Despite the natural setting,
to our knowledge this is the ﬁrst work to address it.
As we discuss in the paper, there is more than one notion of fairness that
one might consider. Our primary notion of fairness – k-fairness – places a
25cap on the disutility of each agent and thus on the discrepancy between the
disutilities of diﬀerent agents (our secondary notion of fairness – competence
penalty – plays only a secondary role). This notion of fairness is inﬂuenced
by computer science (speciﬁcally, the max-min criterion of bandwidth allo-
cation), but should not appear foreign to economists as well. For example,
Hammond [5] shows that Rawls’ maximin rule can be used to satisfy Arrow’s
conditions for a social welfare function when they are modiﬁed to incorporate
comparisons among the agents. Our paper considers a related but diﬀerent
problem, because the selected social choice function must be implemented in
a setting where agent types are privately known. As was shown in this paper,
the self-interest of the agents limits the space of social choice functions that
we can implement.
Of course, other notions could be studied, and this is an avenue for future
research. Alternatively, we could move the goal of fairness from the set of goals
of the mechanism designer to the utility functions of the agents. Although this
models somewhat diﬀerent situations than those that we have in mind and
that were illustrated in the introduction, it can be interesting as well. Each
agent’s utility function could then be a function of not only the outcome for
this agent and its own type, but also of the entire vector of declared types and
the outcomes for all agents. A body of research already exists that considers
fairness in this manner, where it is typically examined in the context of speciﬁc
games such as the ultimatum or dictator game. For example, [6] presents a
model in which the utility of each agent depends on equity, reciprocity (for
past cooperation or the failure to do so), and the agent’s relative position
among all agents. It would be interesting to approach this setting from a
mechanism-design perspective.
26Returning to the alternative interpretation of our setting as an auction setting,
our results concern the fair division of the payment made by the winning
bidder. In order to achieve eﬃciency the winning bidder is charged the second-
highest bid. As is well known, this amount cannot then simply be redistributed
amongst the agents, because the agent with the second-highest bid would then
have incentive to not bid truthfully (speciﬁcally, to bid higher). Instead, the
optimal redistribution rule is to pay each agent the second-highest bid of the
other agents, achieving 3-fairness. The meaning of the competence penalty in
this setting is that the agent with the second-highest bid receives a smaller
payment than that of the agents who value the good less.
We concentrated on the single task setting, while also showing how the re-
sults can be generalized to multiple tasks. As we move to a number of tasks
much greater than two, the computational cost of determining allocation and
payment rules can become prohibitive. Similar problems are faced in winner
determination of combinatorial auctions, which have attracted much interest
in recent years; solutions range from more eﬃcient algorithms [7,8] to a shift
to iterative mechanisms [9]. Exploring these directions in conjunction with the
fairness considerations of this paper presents another opportunity for future
work.
276 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Proof by construction. We describe a transformation
which takes any mechanism Γ (deﬁned by f and its constitutive g and t) that
satisﬁes IC, k-fairness and ND, and returns a mechanism Γ0 (deﬁned by f0, g0,
and t0), which satisﬁes IC, k-fairness, ND, and EE.
We initialize Γ0 to be identical to Γ, and then make any necessary changes. Be-
cause Γ satisﬁes IC, we know that ˆ v = v. For each v, apply the following trans-
formation. If g1(v) = 1, then Γ0 already satisﬁes EE and we are done for this
particular v. Otherwise, we need to alter g0 so that the task is instead assigned
to agent 1, and alter t0 to compensate for this reassignment. Call the service
provider in Γ agent j (that is, gj(v) = 1). To secure EE, we set g0
1(v) = 1 and
g0
j(v) = 0. Then, set t0
1(v) = t1(v)−v1 and t0
j(v) = tj(v)+vj. The changes for
g0 and t0 imply that for all i and v, the utility for agent i is equal in both mech-
anisms. That is, ui(f(v),vi) = ui(f0(v),vi). We can then prove IC by contra-
diction. Assume that Γ0 is not IC; then, there must exist some i, v, and v0
i such
that ui(f0(v0
i,v−i),vi) > ui(f0(vi,v−i),vi). Because our transformation does not
alter utilities, this inequality implies that ui(f(v0
i,v−i),vi) > ui(f(vi,v−i),vi),
contradicting the assumption that Γ satisﬁes IC. The fact that utility remains
constant implies that the k-fairness property of Γ is preserved in Γ0. Finally,
ND continues to hold because
P
i t0
i(v) =
P
i ti(v) − v1 + vj ≥
P
i ti(v).
Proof of Theorem 1: We will use a proof by contradiction that works for
all n ≥ 2. Assume that a mechanism does exist for a given n ≥ 2 that satisﬁes
IC, 2-fairness, and ND. Consider a vector v in which v1 < v2. We will show a
lower bound on the payment to the service provider, and then an upper bound
28on the payments made by the other agents. These bounds will guarantee that
ND cannot be satisﬁed.
Because of IC, we know that all agents other than agent 1 declare truthfully
(that is, ˆ v−1 = v−1). Lemma 1 tells us that if a satisfying mechanism does exist,
then there must exist one that satisﬁes EE. Thus, we can assume that if agent
1 declares truthfully, then it will be assigned the task (that is, g1(v1,v−1) = 1).
We now show that regardless of the particular value of v1, subject to the con-
straint that v1 < v2, agent 1’s payment, t1(v1,v−1), must be constant. Other-
wise, there must be two types v0
1,v00
1 < v2 such that t1(v0
1,v−1) > t1(v00
1,v−1).
Because agent 1’s utility function is u1(f(ˆ v1,v−1),v1) = −v1 − t1(ˆ v1,v−1),
this agent would have incentive to falsely declare v00
1 when its true type is v0
1,
violating IC.
Furthermore, we can show an upper bound of t1(v1,v−1) ≤ −n−1
n v2 on this
constant value. If this bound did not hold, then t1(v1,v−1) = −n−1
n v2 + ,
for some  > 0. Consider the possibility of v1 = v2 − δ, where δ < . Then,
u1(f(v),v1) = −(v2 − δ) − (−n−1
n v2 + ) = −v2/n + δ −  < −v2/n, violating
2-fairness.
Next, consider any other agent i, where i 6= 1. Holding the declarations of
the other agents ﬁxed at ˆ v−i = v−i, it must be the case that ti(vi,v−i) is
constant for all possible types of agent i such that vi > v1. That is, as long
as agent i’s type would not make it the service in the case of a truthful
declaration, it must always pay the same amount. If this were not true, then
there must exist two types v0
i,v00
i > v1 such that ti(v0
i,v−i) > ti(v00
i ,v−i). Since
ui(f(ˆ vi,v−i),vi) = −ti(ˆ vi,v−i), agent i would have incentive to falsely declare
v00
i when its true type is v0
i, violating IC. Next, we can show an upper bound
29on this constant payment for all vi > v1: ti(vi,v−i) ≤ v1/n. If this were not
true, then ti(vi,v−i) = (v1 + )/n for some  > 0. Consider the possibility of
v2 = v1 + δ, where δ < . In this case, ui(f(v),v1) = −(v1 + )/n < −v2/n,
violating 2-fairness.
Since the above argument holds for the n − 1 agents other than the service
provider (agent 1) when all agents declare their type truthfully, we have an
upper bound on the net payments to the center: Σi6=1ti(v) + t1(v) ≤ (n − 1) ·
v1
n − n−1
n v2. Since v2 > v1, ND is not satisﬁed, reaching a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2: We start by proving IC. Consider any possible dec-
laration vector ˆ v. We need to show that any agent i whose declaration is
truthful (ˆ vi = vi) could not increase its utility by making an alternate decla-
ration, holding ˆ v−i constant. Since we will need to talk about properties of the
original declaration vector ˆ v throughout the proof, we will use ˆ v0
i to denote
this alternate declaration.
There are three possible “classes” that a truthful agent i could fall into:
(1) vi = ˆ v[1] and gi(ˆ v) = 1
(2) vi = ˆ v[2] and gi(ˆ v) = 0
(3) vi > ˆ v[2] and gi(ˆ v) = 0
In the ﬁrst class, ui(f(vi, ˆ v−i),vi) = −vi+ˆ v[2]−
ˆ v[3]
n . We know that ui(f(vi, ˆ v−i),vi) ≥
−
ˆ v[3]
n , since gi(vi, ˆ v−i) = 1 implies that vi ≤ ˆ v[2]. Any alternate declaration such
that ˆ v0
i < ˆ v[2] would not change g(·) or t(·), and thus would not change agent
i’s utility. For all ˆ v0
i > ˆ v[2], agent i’s utility is ui(f(ˆ v0
i, ˆ v−i),vi) = −
ˆ v[3]
n , because
it is never chosen as the service provider. The ﬁnal possibility of ˆ v0
i = ˆ v[2] is
covered by one of the previous two cases, depending on how the tie is broken.
30Thus, there does not exist a ˆ v0
i such that ui(f(ˆ v0
i, ˆ v−i),vi) > ui(f(vi, ˆ v−i),vi).
In the second class, ui(f(vi, ˆ v−i),vi) = −
ˆ v[3]
n . If ˆ v0
i < ˆ v1, then ui(f(ˆ v0
i, ˆ v−i),vi) =
−vi+ˆ v[1]−
ˆ v[3]
n , because agent i becomes the service provider and ˆ v[1] becomes
the second highest declaration. In this case we know that ui(f(ˆ v0
i, ˆ v−i),vi) <
−
ˆ v[3]
n , since gi(vi, ˆ v−i) = 0 implies that vi > ˆ v[1]. Alternatively, if ˆ v0
i > ˆ v[1],
then ui(f(ˆ v0
i, ˆ v−i),vi) = −
ˆ v[3]
n . The case of ˆ v0
i = ˆ v[1] is covered by one of
the previous two cases, depending on how the tie is broken. Thus, for all
ˆ v0
i: ui(f(ˆ v0
i, ˆ v−i),vi) ≤ ui(f(vi, ˆ v−i),vi).
IC in the third class is shown exactly the same way as it was in the second
class. The only diﬀerence is that
ˆ v[3]
n is replaced by
ˆ v[2]
n in ui(·) to reﬂect the
change in the second lowest declaration of the other agents.
We now show that the remaining requirements are also satisﬁed. EE follows
directly from IC and the deﬁnition of Fair3. Substituting v for ˆ v in equations
we derived during the proof of IC, we have ui(f(v),vi) ≥ −
v[3]
n for an agent in
class 1, ui(f(v),vi) = −
v[3]
n for an agent in class 2, and ui(f(v),vi) = −
v[2]
n for
an agent in class 3, proving 3-fairness. Finally, for ND:
X
i
ti(v)=t1(v) + t2(v) +
X
i≥3
ti(v)
=(−v[2] +
v[3]
n
) +
v[3]
n
+
X
i≥3
v[2]
n
≥−v[2] +
n
n
v[2]
=0
Proof of Theorem 3: The proof of this result for n = 2 follows directly
from Theorem 1. We will prove by contradiction that it holds for all n ≥ 3
31using an argument that does not depend on the speciﬁc n chosen. Assume
that a mechanism does exist for a given n ≥ 3 that satisﬁes IC, n-fairness,
and ND, and does not enforce a competence penalty. Consider the possibility
that v1 < v2 holds in the vector v of true types, and that all agents declare
truthfully. By Lemma 1, we can assume that g1(v) = 1. (Recall that we have
assumed an ordering on the agents from ease of exposition.)
The ﬁrst step is to prove by induction that for each agent i such that 1 < i ≤ n
(i.e., the non-service providers), ti(v) ≤ vi−1/n must hold. Starting with the
base case of i = n, we must show that tn(v) ≤ vn−1/n. Because of n-fairness,
tn(v) ≤ vn/n, since un(f(v),vn) = −tn(v). IC requires the mechanism to keep
tn(ˆ vn,v−n) constant for all declarations of agent n subject to the constraint
that ˆ vn > vn−1. Otherwise, there must exist two types v0
n,v00
n > vn−1 such
that tn(v0
n,v−n) > tn(v00
n,v−n). IC would then be violated because agent n
has incentive to falsely declare v00
n when its true type is v0
n. Next, we can
show the desired upper bound on this constant payment for all ˆ vn > vn−1:
tn(ˆ vn,v−n) ≤ vn−1/n. If this were not true, then tn(ˆ vn,v−n) = (vn−1 +)/n for
some  > 0. Consider the possibility of vn = vn−1 + δ, where δ < . In this
case, tn(v) > vn/n, contradicting a bound we derived above. Therefore, the
base case holds.
We now prove the inductive step for each i in the range 1 < i < n. By the
inductive assumption, ti+1(v) ≤ vi/n. We must show that ti(v) ≤ vi−1/n. To
avoid a competence penalty, ti(v) ≤ ti+1(v) ≤ vi/n. Furthermore, ti(ˆ vi,v−i)
must be constant for all ˆ vi > vi−1 by the same incentive compatibility ar-
gument used above, because such a declaration cannot change the service
provider for any i > 1. We can then show an upper bound of ti(ˆ vi,v−i) ≤
vi−1/n, also by a similar argument as above. Thus, the inductive step holds,
32and we can conclude that for each agent agent i such that 1 < i ≤ n,
ti(v) ≤ vi−1/n.
The second step is to show that these bounds prevent the mechanism from
satisfying n-fairness. To do this, we use a possible instance of v that can be
applied to any value of n ≥ 3. Consider the case in which v1 = 0, and for all
i > 1, vi = n2 +i. Also, let v be the declared types of the agents. Since this v
satisﬁes the constraint of v1 < v2, the bounds we just derived hold. Thus, the
net payment from the non-service providers to the center is as follows.
n X
i=2
ti(v)≤
n X
i=2
vi−1/n
≤0 +
n−1 X
i=2
(n
2 + i)/n
<
n2(n − 2) + (n − 1)(n)/2
n
=n
2 − 1.5n − 0.5
Because of ND, we also have a bound on the payment from the center to the
service provider: −t1(v) ≤
Pn
i=2 ti(v) < n2 − 1.5n − 0.5. We also know that
−t1(ˆ v1,v−1) must be constant for all ˆ v1 < v2, by the same incentive compat-
ibility used above. Thus, it must be the case that −t1(v0
1,v−1) = −t1(v) <
n2 −1.5n−0.5, when the declared type of agent 1 is: v0
1 = n2 +1. However, it
is possible that v0
1 is also the true type of agent 1. In this case, agent 1’s loss
of utility is too large to satisfy n-fairness.
33u1(f(v
0
1,v−1),v
0
1)=−t1(v
0
1,v−1) − v
0
1
=−t1(v1,v−1) − v
0
1
<n
2 − 1.5n − 0.5 − (n
2 + 1)
=−1.5n − 1.5
=−
1.5n2 + 1.5n
n
<−
n2 + n
n
=−
vn
n
Since n-fairness is violated, we have reached a contradiction, and the proof is
complete.
Proof of Theorem 4: The proof of IC is almost identical to that of mech-
anism Fair3. The only diﬀerence between the two mechanisms is that the
“oﬀset” payment (
ˆ v−i[1]
n ) is changed to use the lowest declaration among all
other agents instead of the second lowest declaration from this set. Since the
agent’s own type still does not aﬀect this term, IC follows in an identical
fashion.
EE then follows directly from IC and the deﬁnition of BoundedFair1. For 1-
fairness, we examine the two classes that an agent can fall into: the service
provider, or a non-service provider. For the service provider, ui(f(v),vi) =
−vi + v[2] −
v[2]
n (because ˆ v = v), which can be re-written as: ui(f(v),vi) =
−
vi
n − n−1
n vi + n−1
n v[2]. Because this agent is the service provider and EE is
satisﬁed, we know that vi = v[1] ≤ v[2] and thus that ui(f(v),vi) ≥ −
v[1]
n . For a
non-service provider, ui(f(v),vi) = −
v[1]
n . These two facts, combined with IC,
imply 1-fairness.
Finally, to show (v[2] − v[1])-BD, we carry out the following calculations.
34X
i
ti(v)=t1(v) +
X
i6=1
ti(v)
=−v[2] +
v[2]
n
+
X
i6=1
v[1]
n
=−
n − 1
n
v[2] +
n − 1
n
v[1]
≥−(v[2] − v[1])
357 Footnotes
1We thank John McMillan for this observation.
2We could allow g to be any value between 0 and 1 to denote the probability
that agent i is selected as the service provider. However, we will later show
that it suﬃces to only consider mechanisms that always assign the task to the
assign with the lowest cost.
3We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this connection.
368 Tables
Table 1
Types of agents used in example of Mechanism Fair3b.
i vi({1}) vi({2}) vi({1,2})
1 11 10 21
2 14 13 20
3 5 16 30
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